With the introduction of NGNs, operators need to upgrade their access networks because in several cases, existing access networks can no longer meet increasing customer expectations. Evolving consumer expectations will require changes to the existing access network -next generation access. However, existing technologies faces some difficulties and are not ready for large-scale roll-out yet. For example, in the case of DSL technologies, the great majority of operators with copper networks are improving their networks, making investments to deploy fiber optics closer to customers and offering higher-speed access, which is required for new emerging services (reducing the distance between fiber and the users.). The entry of new competitors can be based on the resale of services from the incumbent, on building up their own infrastructures, on renting unbundled infrastructure from incumbents, or, on the combination of the above elements. Then, is important create the right incentive for operators to make an efficient build/buy choice and define the appropriate pricing principles.
Introduction
The advent of NGN (new network technologies, access infrastructures, and even services) has changed the concept of telecommunication networks and has profound implications for operators and regulators. The definition of policies and regulations for competition in the access networks constitute one of the most debated issues in telecommunications today. The regulation of telecommunications networks and services is seen as a necessary requirement in most countries to meet government objectives and to ensure public interest. Regulation is fundamental to generate positive welfare effects where markets alone would not tend to perfect competition. But, as referred by [1] , the major problem is how to measure these welfare effects, as they can occur as consumer surplus, producer surplus, societal gains (e.g., increased tax income, better working conditions, etc.). Their empirical study uses price situation to examine the welfare effects measured by the state of competition. They assumed that the increase of competition reduces prices in the market and that competition can also increase consumer welfare without reducing prices (achieved by innovation). Public policies should promote an efficient investment and competition in all markets (see fig. 1 ).
The two main economic reasons that have been used to justify interventions in access networks are the beliefs that access networks constitute a natural monopoly for which competition is not feasible in principle and that regulation is, therefore, necessary to control monopoly power and to achieve universal service in which all (or most) users have the opportunity to affordably access the services of the network. The challenge of telecom operators to provide a profitable deployment of broadband services depends if is a high or a low competition area. In areas with high competition already exists competition between broadband network operators, and the main question is know the market share of all intervenient. However, in low competition areas high investments cost must be incurred to promote broadband. [2] argued that national or regional policy concerns can also affect NGA roll out. Without some type of intervention, there is the risk for a new digital divide, with urban customers on short loops being able to receive IPTV/multi-media services and HDTV while those in rural areas might not be able to receive such services. Therefore, the access network poses serious challenges to the regulator [3] .
The question then becomes whether it is more important to stimulate investment or to ensure competition. Investment in network quality is important for consumers because it provides access to both better quality and speed to services, such as Web browsing and email, and services that require more bandwidth, such as video. Investment in network quality also improves the service value for consumers and attracts new consumers to the market. Therefore, there are two major options for access regulation [2]: temporary or permanent deregulation (i.e., the removal of sector-specific rules and regulations) or mandated access (i.e., the obligation to grant access to bottleneck facilities at a regulated price and quality). Deregulation increases investment incentives, as it overcomes the "truncating problem" and allows above-normal profits. However, in the absence of alternative infrastructures or in areas of low population density under limited competition or the threat of entry into the upstream market, an integrated incumbent might leverage its market power to competitive downstream segments.
For NRAs, one request of decisive importance is if they must foster service-based competition in the first phase of liberalization or to focus on infrastructure-based competition. This decision (infrastructure or service-based) would lead to lower prices, more differentiated and innovative products and improved services for consumers. When access is available at different levels of the incumbent's network, new entrants will be able invest in the infrastructure gradually as sufficient economies of scale became achievable -This concept is the ladder of infrastructure competition. This concept defends that new entrants (or access seekers) may enter the market offering broadband access by reselling the wholesale services of the incumbent operator (requires least investment) where they only cover minor elements of the value chain ( Figure 2) . When the number of customer grows and financial means become available, the operator move on to higher rungs of the ladder [1, 4] . Next, new entrants need to building their own infrastructure and acquiring only the residual infrastructure from the incumbent's wholesale department. This includes a move for the operators from service to infrastructure-based competition.
